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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Michael Ian Kramer appeals from the district court's appellate ruling 
affirming Kramer's conviction for driving under the influence. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The state charged Kramer with DUI, carrying a concealed weapon while 
under the influence, and transporting an open container. (R., pp. 38-40.) After 
the jury had been sworn Kramer moved to exclude certain documentary evidence 
about calibration of the breath-testing instrument based on a claim that it had not 
been timely disclosed to the defense. (Trial Tr., p. 1, L. 6; p. 4, L. 25 - p. 5, L. 
17; p. 8, L. 16 - p. 9, L. 22; p. 15, Ls. 9-15.) Kramer's trial counsel 
acknowledged having made no effort to obtain the documents despite knowledge 
of their existence, asserting that he assumed that the prosecution did not intend 
to use the breath test against his client because the prosecution had not provided 
the documents. (Trial Tr., p. 9, L. 23 - p. 11, L. 19.) Kramer also asserted that 
admission of the documents would violate his confrontation rights. (Trial Tr., p. 
11, L. 20-p.15, L. 8; p. 15, L. 15-p. 16, L.15.) 
In ruling on the motions, the trial court stated that it would grant a recess 
to discuss the matter with a potential state witness regarding calibration before 
he was called. (Trial Tr., p. 25, Ls. 8-19.) This expert, however, was never 
called at trial. (Trial Tr., Index.) The trial court also distinguished the authority 
cited by the defense noting that there was a difference between calibration of 
testing equipment and an affidavit that the substance in question is cocaine. 
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(Trial Tr., p. 25, L. 19 - p. 26, L. 12.) The court also allowed the defense to 
preserve any foundational issues and raise them during the trial. (Trial Tr., p. 26, 
Ls. 12-14.) 
At trial the state moved for admission of State's Exhibit 2, which 
apparently included the calibration documents. (Trial Tr., p. 131, Ls. 18-19.) 
Kramer renewed his confrontation objection. (Trial Tr., p. 131, L. 20 - p. 133, L. 
21.) The trial court overruled the objection. (Trial Tr., p. 133, L. 22 - p. 134, L. 2.) 
The jury convicted Kramer on the open container and DUI counts, but 
acquitted on the concealed weapon charge. (R., pp. 176-78.) Kramer timely 
appealed the judgment to the district court. (R., pp. 184-89.) The district court 
affirmed and Kramer appealed to this Court. (R., pp. 253-76.) 
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ISSUES 
Kramer states the issues on appeal as: 
A. Did the trial court commit reversible error in admitting the 
breath test certificates to lay a foundation for the breath test 
where the prosecution failed to timely disclose certificates 
after the defense filed a timely discovery demand? 
B. Did the trial court commit reversible error in admitting the 
breath test certificates to lay a foundation for the breath test 
in violation of the defendant's right of confrontation under the 
Sixth Amendment, Crawford v. Washington, Melendez-Diaz, 
and Bui/coming v. New Mexico? 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 11-12 (balding omitted).) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. The trial court declined to exclude evidence as a discovery sanction. Has 
Kramer failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion? 
2. The trial court overruled an objection that admission of documents 
regarding calibration of the lntoxilyzer 5000 violated the Confrontation 
Clause unless those documents were presented through live testimony. 
Has Kramer failed to show that admission of documents prepared in the 
regular course of maintenance of the lntoxilyzer 5000 violated the 
Confrontation Clause? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Kramer Has Failed To Show That The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion When It 
Declined To Exclude Evidence As A Discovery Sanction 
A. Introduction 
The record shows that the state timely disclosed the lntoxilyzer 5000 test 
results, about a year before trial. (R., pp. 21-23; Trial Tr., p. 18, Ls. 16-23.) The 
prosecutor stated that she forwarded the calibration documents upon receiving 
them earlier the week of trial, even though there was no request for such 
documents in the discovery requests served by Kramer. (Trial Tr., p. 18, L. 21 -
p. 19, L. 8.) Kramer's counsel acknowledged making no effort to secure the 
calibration documents, either by obtaining copies from other sources or by filing a 
motion to compel. (Trial Tr., p. 9, L. 23 - p. 11, L. 19.) Rather, Kramer's counsel 
stated he merely "anticipated" that the state would not seek to admit the breath 
testresultattrial. (Trial Tr., p.11, Ls.13-19.) 
At no point did the trial court hold that the prosecution violated discovery 
requirements. (See generally Trial Tr.) The trial court did state that if the 
prosecution relied upon a newly disclosed expert to establish calibration of the 
lntoxilyzer 5000 that it would consider granting additional time for the defense to 
interview that witness. (Trial Tr., p. 25, L. 6 - p. 26, L. 14.) That expert, 
however, did not testify at trial. (Trial Tr., Index.) The trial court also imposed no 
sanction. 
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On appeal Kramer generally claims that there was a discovery violation 
and that it deprived him of a fair trial. (Appellant's brief, pp. 12-15.) His claims of 
error and prejudice are without merit. 
B. Standard Of Review 
What sanction to impose for a discovery violation is within the discretion of 
the trial court, and the exercise of that discretion "'is beyond the purview of a 
reviewing court unless it has been clearly abused."' State v. Stradley, 127 Idaho 
203, 208, 899 P.2d 416, 421 (1995) (quoting State v. Buss, 98 Idaho 173, 174, 
560 P.2d 495, 496 (1977)). See also State v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 99, 104, 175 
P.3d 788, 793 (2008). A clear abuse of discretion will be found only where the 
court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. 
State v. Bird, 119 Idaho 196, 198, 804 P.2d 925, 927 (Ct. App. 1990). 
C. Kramer Has Failed To Show Either A Discovery Violation Or Prejudice 
A trial court may, within its discretion, impose sanctions for discovery 
violations. I.C.R. 16(e); State v. Stradley, 127 Idaho 203,208, 899 P.2d 416,421 
(1995); State v. Winson, 129 Idaho 298, 302, 923 P.2d 1005, 1009 (Ct. App 
1996). In determining an appropriate sanction, the court should consider the 
prejudice suffered by the party alleging the discovery violation. Cf. State v. 
Saxton, 133 Idaho 546, 548, 989 P.2d 288, 290 (Ct. App. 1999). 
"[S]ome balancing of the equities and some consideration of the 
efficacy of lesser sanctions must precede a trial court's imposition 
of a sanction which will significantly impair a party's ability to 
present its case on the merits at trial. Borrowing from Justice 
Donaldson's concurrence in [Southern Idaho Production Credit 
Ass'n v. Astorquia, 113 Idaho 526, 746 P.2d 985 (1987)], we hold 
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that a trial court, 'must balance the equities by comparing the 
culpability of the disobedient party with the resulting prejudice to the 
innocent party.' Astorquia, 113 Idaho at 532, 746 P.2d at 990. 
Second, a trial court should not impose a sanction that will prevent 
full adjudication of a case on the merits without having first 
considered lesser sanctions and having reached a conclusion, 
supported by the record, that lesser sanctions would be ineffective 
or inadequate." 
Milburn v. State, 135 Idaho 701, 705, 23 P.3d 775, 779 (Ct. App. 2000) (quoting 
Roe v. Doe, 129 Idaho 663, 668, 931 P.2d 657, 662 (Ct. App. 1996)). See also, 
Saxton, 133 Idaho at 548, 989 P.2d at 290 ("The court is also obligated to 
consider less severe remedies, such as a short continuance, a mistrial, or 
imposition of sanctions ... that might serve as an alternative to excluding the 
evidence.") Furthermore, "the imposition of discovery sanctions is to be the 
result of an exercise of reason by the trial court, not limited to those suggested by 
the attorneys." Winson, 129 Idaho at 303,923 P.2d at 1010. 
A party seeking the exclusion of evidence as a sanction for a discovery 
violation must establish prejudice. Roe v. Doe, 129 Idaho 663, 668, 931 P.2d 
657, 662 (Ct. App. 1996). "Where a late-disclosed witness has been allowed to 
testify despite the defendant's objection to the untimely disclosure, [the appellate 
court] will not reverse in the absence of a showing that the delayed disclosure 
prejudiced the defendant's preparation or presentation of his defense." State v. 
Allen, 145 Idaho 183, 185, 177 P.3d 397, 399 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing State v. 
Byington, 132 Idaho 589, 592, 977 P.2d 203, 206 (1999); State v. Pizzuto, 119 
Idaho 742, 751, 810 P.2d 680, 689 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State 
v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,432, 825 P.2d 1081, 1088 (1991); State v. Johnson, 132 
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Idaho 726, 728, 979 P.2d 128, 130 (Ct. App. 1999)). As explained by the Court 
of Appeals: 
The prejudice to be considered is impairment of the defendant's 
ability to defend himself at trial caused by the untimeliness of the 
disclosure of witnesses or evidence. Our appellate courts have 
often said that, when an issue of late disclosure of prosecution 
evidence is presented, "the inquiry on appeal is whether the 
lateness of the disclosure so prejudiced the defendant's preparation 
or presentation of his defense that he was prevented from receiving 
his constitutionally guaranteed fair trial. This ordinarily requires that 
the complaining party demonstrate that the late disclosure 
hampered his ability to meet the evidence at trial, had a deleterious 
effect on his trial strategy, or that it deprived him of the opportunity 
to raise a valid challenge to the admissibility of evidence. 
Allen, 145 Idaho at 185-86, 177 P.3d at 399-400 (emphasis original, citations 
omitted). 
At trial the prejudice claimed by Kramer was that he had not hired any 
experts because he merely assumed that because it had not provided the 
calibration documents the prosecution had elected not to use the breath test. 
(Trial Tr., p. 10, Ls. 9-17; p. 11, Ls. 13-19.) The trial court was not required to 
accept such a dubious claim, and apparently did not. 
On appeal Kramer cites the fact that the first sample he provided was 
invalid for testing and the fact that that the officer did not have personal 
knowledge of what testing solution had been placed in the machine, and argues 
he was "hampered in his ability to challenge the admissibility and reliability of the 
breath test by the untimely disclosure of the breath test certificates." (Appellant's 
brief, p. 15.) He fails, however, to articulate how the timing of the disclosure 
affected his ability to prepare to address these issues at trial. (Appellant's brief, 
pp. 12-15.) Indeed, he fails to make any connection whatsoever between the 
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timing of the disclosure and either the validity of the first sample or the officer's 
personal knowledge regarding the simulator solution. Because Kramer has failed 
to articulate, much less show, any prejudice related to the timing of the disclosure 
of the calibration documents he has failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion. 
A. 
11. 
Kramer Has Failed To Show That Admission Of Documents Prepared In The 
Regular Course Of Calibration Of The lntoxilyzer 5000 Violated The 
Confrontation Clause 
Introduction 
During the trial the state submitted, and the trial court admitted, State's 
Exhibit 2. (Trial Tr., p. 131. L. 18 - p. 134, L. 2.) On appeal Kramer claims that 
admission of State's Exhibit 2 violated his right to confront the witnesses against 
him. (Appellant's brief, pp. 15-20.) This argument fails for two reasons. First, 
State's Exhibit 2 has not been included in the appellate record. Thus, Kramer 
has failed to present an adequate record for appellate review of his claim. 
Second, to the extent its contents can be gleaned from the record, State's Exhibit 
2 consisted of documents kept in the normal course of business and related to 
routine calibration of the lntoxilyzer 5000. Such documents, however, are not 
testimonial and therefore did not trigger the right to confrontation. 
B. Standard Of Review 
When reviewing a claimed violation of the Confrontation Clause the 
appellate court defers to the trial court's factual findings unless clearly erroneous, 
but gives free review to the trial court's legal determinations. State v. Hooper, 
145 Idaho 139,141,176 P.3d 911,913 (2007). 
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C. Kramer's Claim Fails Because The Appellate Record Is Incomplete 
The appellant has the burden of providing an adequate record to 
substantiate his or her claims of error before the appellate court. State v. 
Beason, 119 Idaho 103, 105, 803 P.2d 1009, 1011 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. 
Murinko, 108 Idaho 872, 873, 702 P.2d 910, 911 (Ct. App. 1985). "In the 
absence of an adequate record on appeal, we will not presume error." State v. 
Longoria, 133 Idaho 819, 823, 992 P.2d 1219, 1223 (Ct. App. 1999). "Missing 
portions of the record must be presumed to support the action of the trial court." 
~ at 823, 992 P.2d at 1223 (citing Kugler v. Drown, 119 Idaho 687, 690, 809 
P.2d 1166, 1169 (Ct. App. 1991)). 
State's Exhibit 2 is not currently in the appellate record. (See R., p. 279 
(listing no exhibits on clerks certificate).) From the parties' description the exhibit 
apparently consists of a certification that the other documents are true and 
correct copies; a certification that the lntoxilyzer 5000 device complies with state 
standards; a certification from the manufacturer that the device complies with 
federal standards; a certification that the simulator solution used in calibration 
contained a certain percentage of alcohol; and a log of when the machine was 
used to test breath samples. (Trial Tr., p. 87, L. 10 - p. 88, L. 18; p. 91, L. 24 -
p. 94, L. 12; p. 131, L. 20- p. 132, L. 21; p. 172, L. 11 - p. 174, L. 7.1) The 
1 The state is in no way stipulating or conceding that the representations of 
Kramer's counsel about the nature or content of the exhibit were accurate. The 
state is citing to those representations only by way of demonstrating the entirety 
of the appellate record relating to the contents of State's Exhibit 2. 
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description provided is generally consistent with the contents of the state's 
supplemental response to discovery. (See R., pp. 108-16.) 
Kramer claims that admission of State's Exhibit 2 was error. (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 15-18.) State's Exhibit 2 is not in the record before this Court. Kramer 
invites this Court to review the documents attached to the state's discovery 
response and assume that they are the same documents in State's Exhibit 2. 
Such an assumption would not be appropriate. State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 
482, 488, 211 P.3d 91, 97 (2009) (court will not presume error; absence of 
diqgram, used for illustrative purposes only, prevented Court from reaching 
question of whether defendant was detained). Because Kramer has failed to 
present an adequate record for appellate review, his claim must be rejected. 
D. Kramer Has Failed To Show That The Confrontation Clause Applies To 
The Calibration Records Because They Are Not Testimonial 
Even if the appellate record were adequate for review, Kramer has shown 
no error. The Confrontation Clause applies to '"witnesses' against the accused -
in other words, those who 'bear testimony."' Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 
36, 51 (2004) (quotes original, citations omitted). "'Testimony,' in turn, is typically 
'[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or 
proving some fact."' l!;l (quotation and brackets original, citation omitted). Thus, 
the underlying reasoning of Crawford is that the Confrontation Clause applies to 
evidence that is the functional equivalent of bearing testimony against the 
accused. 
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The Supreme Court addressed what constitutes testimony in the area of 
scientific or expert evidence in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, _ U.S. _, 
129 S.Ct. 2527 (2009), where the Court held that notarized certificates, setting 
forth the results of laboratory analysis determining that the substance possessed 
by Melendez-Diaz was cocaine, were the equivalent of affidavits and therefore 
testimonial. kl at 2530-32. The Court stated, however, in response to the 
dissent's assertion that calibration of scientific instruments would have to be 
established by live testimony, that it was not holding, "and it is not the case, that 
anyone whose testimony may be relevant in establishing the chain of custody, 
authenticity of the sample, or accuracy of the testing device, must appear in 
person as part of the prosecution's case." kl at 2532 n.1 (emphasis added); see 
also id. at 2545 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Instead, "documents prepared in the 
regular course of equipment maintenance may well qualify as nontestimonial 
records." Id. 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts recently addressed the 
applicability of Crawford and Melendez-Diaz to documents showing calibration of 
BAG testing devices. Commonwealth v. Zeininger, 947 N.E.2d 1060 (Mass. 
2011). After stating the legal standards set forth in Crawford and Melendez-Diaz, 
id. at 1067-68, the court concluded that the Supreme Court of the United States 
has drawn 
a distinction between traditionally admissible business records and 
testimony within the scope of the confrontation clause: "Business 
and public records are generally admissible absent confrontation ... 
because-having been created for the administration of an entity's 
affairs and not for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact 
at trial-they are not testimonial." 
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~ at 1068-69 (quoting Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2539-40). The court then 
concluded that certifications of the calibration of breath testing devices are 
"outside the orbit of the 'common nucleus' of the various definitions of 
'testimonial' set forth in Crawford." Zeininger, 947 N.E.2d at 1069. The court 
drew a distinction between the affidavits that were direct proof of an element of 
the crime in Melendez-Diaz and certificates of calibration that "bear only on the 
admissibility or credibility" of breath test evidence. ~ "We agree with the Court 
of Appeals of Oregon, which concluded that such records 'bear a more 
attenuated relationship with conviction: They support one fact (the accuracy of 
the machine) that, in turn, supports another fact that can establish guilt (blood 
alcohol level)."' ~ (quoting State v. Bergin, 217 P.3d 1087, 1089 (Or. App. 
2009)). The certification records regarding calibration of the breath testing 
instruments were in the nature of routine administrative records, rather than 
direct proof of guilt, and were therefore not testimonial and not subject to 
confrontation. Id. at 1069-70.2 
The reasoning of the Massachusetts Supreme Court is persuasive. The 
Supreme Court of the United States has drawn a distinction between records of 
routine and administrative functions, on one hand, and documents prepared for 
proving a particular case, on the other, for purposes of determining what is 
testimonial for purposes of application of the Confrontation Clause. Here the 
2 The Massachusetts Supreme Court also noted that, with one exception, other 
courts that had considered the question had reached the same conclusion; that 
records regarding calibration of testing devices are not testimonial. Zeininger, 
947 N.E.2d at 1070 n.19 (and cases cited). 
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certificates that the lntoxilyzer 5000 was manufactured in conformance with 
national standards, that the simulator solutions contained the right ratios of 
alcohol, and the log showing number of uses for purposes of doing routine 
maintenance and re-calibration were not created with the idea of prosecuting 
Kramer. They were merely documentation of routine acts to make sure the 
breath testing machine was in good working order. As such, they were not 
testimonial and did not require confrontation. Kramer has therefore failed to 
show a violation of his confrontation rights in the admission of State's Exhibit 2. 
E. Even If There Had Been Error The Error Was Harmless 
"Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial 
rights shall be disregarded." I.C.R. 52. Error is harmless when there is no 
reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the jury's verdict and the Court 
can "declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. 
Fernandez, 124 Idaho 381, 383-84, 859 P.2d 1389, 1391-92 (1993) (citations 
omitted). 
As noted above, the evidence of calibration goes only to the admissibility 
or credibility of the lntoxilyzer 5000 results. Commonwealth v. Zeininger, 947 
N. E.2d 1060, 1069 (Mass. 2011 ). Admissibility was a question for the court and 
not the jury, so any alleged confrontation violation would not have caused the 
exclusion of the BAG test results. I.R.E. 104(a) (preliminary questions of 
admissibility determined by court). The calibration evidence was irrelevant to the 
open container conviction. Given the overwhelming evidence that Kramer was 
either over the .08 BAG threshold (State's Exhibit 1; Trial Tr., p. 134, Ls. 22-24) 
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or under the influence (State's Exhibit 3; Trial Tr., p. 52, L. 2 - p. 74, L. 12; p. 99, 
Ls. 2-12), the lack of calibration evidence would not have affected the outcome of 
the trial as to the DUI count either. Thus, any error in allowing the jury to 
consider the calibration documents was harmless. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Kramer's conviction for 
DUI and open container. 
DATED this 1st day of November, 2011. 
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